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Dynamic duopoly with best-price clauses
Monika Schnitzer'*'
This article investigates best-price clauses as a strategic device to facilitate collusion in
a dynamic duopoly game. Best-price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if
a customer finds a better price after his purchase. Two different price clauses are distin-
guished: "most favored customer" and "meet or release." I examine the collusive potential
of both clauses in a finite-horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods. In
each period, new consumers enter the market, I show that in this context, meet-or-release
clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most-favored-customer clauses.
1. Introduction
• Retailers often advertise so-called best-price clauses to attract customers. The buyers
are promised a rebate if they find a better price after making their purchase. The term
best-price clauses comprises both "most favored customer" (MFC) clauses and "meet or
release" (MOR) clauses. A MFC clause guarantees a rebate on the original price if the
seller offers lower prices to other customers thereafter; a MOR clause promises a rebate
(or a release from the contract) if the purchase price is undercut by competing sellers later
on.
In this article I investigate to what extent best-price clauses can help oligopolists
collude on prices in markets for durable consumption goods.' This is of particular interest
since any individual buyer at least weakly prefers to be offered these clauses. They guar-
antee him the lowest price that will be offered in the future, so he need not wait for a
lower price or go to another seller who may offer a better deal later on. However, if best-
price clauses facilitate collusion, buyers as a whole might be better off if their use is
restricted.
An earlier discussion of best-price clauses by Hoit and Scheffman (1987) has been
motivated by the Ethyl Case. In this perhaps most infamous example of the use of best-
price clauses in industrial marketing in the United States, some producers of lead-based
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' This analysis is not restricted to goods that are "durable" in a physical sense. The term durable refers
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antiknock compounds used both MFC and MOR clauses together with a system of advance
price announcements. Following this case, Holt and Scheffman study a market for a ho-
mogeneous good in which the sellers can use advance list price notifications to foster
coordination on a common list price. They assume that all sellers offer both types of best-
price clauses and show that as long as the initial list price does not exceed the Cournot
price, no seller is tempted to revise his price afterwards. Thus, their analysis supports the
Federal Trade Commission's suspicion that in the Ethyl Case the purpose of using best-
price clauses was to reduce price competition.^
However, Holt and Scheffman assume that the sellers use all these instruments, namely
MFC clauses, MOR clauses, and advance list price notifications, at the same time, and
it remains unclear from their analysis what particular role each instrument plays. Since
best-price clauses may be socially beneficial if they save transaction costs, one would like
to know, for example, whether best-price clauses without advance price announcements
are harmless, or whether both types of clauses have to be offered together, or whether
they have to be offered by all oligopolists at the same time in order to sustain collusion.
Furthermore, Holt and Scheffman's model is designed to capture characteristics of the
producer good market of the Ethyl Case. It is important to know to what extent their results
carry over to markets with different features, for example markets in which new consumers
enter over time, or in which a potential buyer may be willing to wait for a better price.
In many consumer markets in which best-price clauses are frequently used, these char-
acteristics are satisfied.
To answer these questions I use a game-theoretic model with two sellers who produce
a homogeneous durable good with identical constant marginal costs and no capacity con-
straints. Each seller decides which clauses to offer and which price to charge over a finite
number of periods to a finite number of overlapping generations of consumers.
My analysis shows that MFC and MOR clauses influence the sellers' strategic be-
havior in different ways. A MFC clause makes a price reduction less attractive because
it has to be granted also to previous customers. Thus, MFC clauses can help to avoid
price competition in the last period, which typically prevents eollusion in finite-horizon
games. However, I show that their impact is limited. In particular, they cannot sustain
profits as high as monopoly profits and they cannot prevent price competition if new
consumers enter the market over time. I demonstrate that in this context a MOR clause
is potentially more powerful as a collusion-facilitating device. It puts a seller at the mercy
of his competitor, who can retroactively undercut his price and thus force him to pay
rebates to his customers. Although MOR clauses cannot avoid price competition in the
end, they can be used to prevent price competition in early periods. If early generations
of consumers do not want to delay their purchase for too long, the duopolists can exploit
the consumers' impatience and sustain even monopoly profits in all but the very last pe-
riods.
MFC clauses have been studied mostly in relation to durable-good monopolies and
the Coase conjecture (see, for example, Butz (1990)). For duopolies with differentiated
nondurable goods, MFC clauses have been analyzed by Cooper (1986) and Neilson and
Winter (1993). Cooper shows that the profits of all sellers may increase even if only one
of them offers a MFC clause. However, as Neilson and Winter point out for some demand
specifications, there may not exist an equilibrium in which both sellers adopt a MFC
pricing policy. I show in a model with homogeneous durable goods that all sellers have
^ Supporting evidence was also provided by laboratory experiments by Grether und Plott (1984).
^ Typical examples are markets for durable con.sumpiion goods (e.g,. electrical appliances) and markets
for services (e.g., travel agencies or airlines), Nole that if goods are consumed immediately, the "release" part
of the MOR clause is redundant. But if the purchase takes place some time before the actual consumption (for
example, if a flight ticket is purchased in advance), a "release" from the contract (returning the ticket) is a
feasible alternative.
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to offer a MFC clause if they are to have any collusive effect at all, and that there exists
an equilibrium in which all sellers will do so.
Most of the other literature on price clauses has focused on one-shot games with so-
called price-matching clauses."^ These have to be distinguished carefully from MOR clauses.
A price-matching clause makes the price a seller offers a function of his competitor's
current price such that it matches lower prices instantaneously.* If each duopolist offers
this clause, effective prices are always the same for both competitors. Therefore it is a
weakly dominant strategy for each seller to set the monopoly price, since none of them
can benefit from offering a lower price. In contrast, a MOR clause does not meet currently
available prices but provides an insurance against the possibility that a better price becomes
available in the future. In this article I show that the monopoly price can be sustained
even if only one seller offers a MOR clause, whereas price-matching clauses facilitate
collusion only if all sellers offer them.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and
formally defines both types of best-price clause. Section 3 analyzes the potential of the
two different clauses to sustain collusion. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
• Consider two sellers, A and B, who produce homogeneous durable goods with iden-
tical constant marginal costs c and no capacity constraints. They sell these goods over a
finite number of periods. The sellers face a continuum of consumers, each of whom wants
to buy one unit of the indivisible good. The buyers have different preferences for when
to buy, and they are not willing to postpone their purchase for more than a limited number
of periods.^
I model consumers in the following stylized way: There are n different generations
of consumers, denoted by index j E. {\, 2, ... , n}. In period r, / = 1 , . . . , « , generation
j = t enters the market. In each generation there is a continuum of types / G [0, 1] of
consumers. A consumer with type / of generation 7 is characterized by an n-tuple of res-
ervation values v'ij, one for each period.
v, ift=jort=j+ 1 and / < «, Vj E [0, K]
O otherwise.
Thus a consumer of generation j is indifferent whether to buy in period t = j or
t = j + 1, but he is not willing to postpone his purchase any longer (if he buys at all).'
Consumers of generation j = n can buy in period n only.
Let D,(p), t = 1, . . . , «, denote the measure of consumers of generation j = t with
v'ij > p. For expositional convenience assume that the distribution over types of consumers
* Price-matching clauses are studied in complele-information models by Logan and Lulter (1989) and
Doyle (!988). In ihe context of incomplete information. Lin (1988) and Png and Hirshleifer (1987) analyze
price-matching clauses as a device to price-discriminate between informed and uninformed buyers.
' Price-matching clauses thus capture the spirit of the "quick response" assumption.
* These specifications capture characteristic features of retail markets for durable consumption goods. A
particular type of, say, a refrigerator is sold for a limited number of periods and is then replaced by a new
type. Whether or not a buyer considers a purchase is determined to a large extent by exogenous variables that
vary across consumers, for instance the need to replace an old model. Thus, not all potential buyers are present
in the market at the same time, and consumers who enter ihe market u'ith the intention to buy will not delay
their purchase for too long.
' It is not necessary for my results that a buyer of generation j does not value the good at all after period
7 + I. All I need is that the reservation price becomes smaller than marginal cost after some finite time.
However, the longer consumers are willing to delay their purchase, the larger the number of "competitive"
periods in Corollary I.
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is the same for all generations. However, the population size of each generation may
differ. Thus we can write
D,ip) = s,D{p), s,^O,t= I n, (I)
where s, is the population size of generation J ^ t. At the end of Section 3 and in Section
4 I discuss possible generalizations of this demand structure. D{p) is assumed to be a
continuous, monotonically decreasing function of p, with £>(0) = 1 and DiV) = 0.
In each period both sellers first simultaneously announce which best-price clauses to
offer for consumers who buy in this period. Then both sellers simultaneously announce
prices p[, S E {A, B}, t = 1, . . . , n.^ All buyers who are in the market in period t and
who did not purchase before simultaneously decide whether to buy and if so from which
seller.^ Purchase contracts are binding, i.e., consumers who bought in previous periods
cannot simply return the good if they find a better price later on. However, they can claim
rebates if possible.
Whether or not rebates can be claimed in any period depends on the price clauses
and prices in previous purchase contracts. To simplify the exposition I assume that price
clauses are valid for only one period, i.e., rebates can be claimed only in the period
immediately after the purchase.'" The size of potential rebates depends on the difference
between prices in periods t and t — 1 {given that clauses are valid for only one period).
More precisely, suppose a buyer has made a purchase in period t — 1 from seller A for
price P'A^. If his purchase contract contains a MFC provision and if p^ < P'A^\ then
the buyer can claim the rebate [/?7' ~ P'A\- Similarly, a MOR clause guarantees that if
PA "^  P'A^^ ^he buyer is entitled to receive the rebate [pJT' ~ P'B]- If the sales contract
contains both clauses and if both p'^ and p'g are smaller than p'^\ then the rebate is
Note that the game has a finite horizon so that consumers who buy in the last period
cannot benefit from best-price clauses. The end of the game is best thought of as the date
when the good is replaced by a newer type. Since best-price clauses usually apply only
to a particular type of the good, no rebates can be claimed if a new product replaces the
old one.
After each period the actions of all players are perfectly observable. Thus strategies
of the sellers and the buyers can be made contingent on the entire history of the game. I
assume that players do not condition their strategies on nonmeasurable sets of consumers.
Buyers and sellers are risk neutral. Each buyer maximizes his undiscounted utility that is
additively separable in his reservation value and the price he pays for the good, taking
into account potential rebates. Each seller maximizes the undiscounted sum of his profits
over all periods. The appropriate solution concept for this game with complete information
is subgame-perfect equilibrium (see Selten (1965)).
3. Best-price clauses and collusion
• It will be useful to start with the analysis of a special case of the model, in which
there are only two periods and no entry of new consumers in the second period, i.e..
* Clauses and prices are chosen sequentially to capture the idea that typically clauses are chosen less
frequently than prices. The results do not change if clauses and prices are determined in every Ath period, while
only prices are chosen in all other periods. (See also footnote 16.)
' I assume that there exists no resale market. Sobel (1991) offers several justifications for this assumption.
First, the good may be consumed by each buyer in the period he buys it. Second, an individual may find it
too costly to market his good. Third, there may be quality uncertainty about the good unless it is directly sold
by the original producers. The last two justifications apply for many consumer durables. The first one is relevant
for services.
"^  If rebates can be claimed in more than one period, the number of "competitive" periods in Corollary
I increases accordingly.
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s, > 0, S2 = 0. This allows me to relate the model to the literature, in particular to Holt
and Scheffman (1987), who discuss a similar setup in their analysis of the Ethyl Case.
Before establishing the first result we must make a few definitions. Let the price p .^
be defined as follows;
1^ = max ] p
-e-c) + [Dip - e) - D(p)]ip - e - c), V e > 0 . (2)
To interpret p^, suppose both sellers quote a price p in the first period and
share demand symmetrically. Consider a seller, say A, who faces the problem whether
or not to lower his price in period 2 by e > 0. If he did offer a MFC clause he is
forced to pay rebates to his previous customers, whieh lowers his first-period profit to
\/2Dip)(p — e - c ) . Also, he cannot win any of the customers who have already bought
in period 1 from seller B, since purchase contracts are binding. So his additional sales are
limited to [Dip — e) — Dip)]. His total profit after lowering his price is
Dip-€)-~Dip)\-ip- e-c).
Thus, p^ is the highest price with the property that no seller has an incentive to deviate
from this priee in period 2. Note that MFC clauses and binding purchase contracts together
imply that seller A's price choice in period 2 is strategically equivalent to choosing a
quantity in a Coumot quantity-setting game. In fact, p,. corresponds to the Coumot price
resulting from setting Coumot quantities if there is a unique Coumot equilibrium."
Let TTXSJ) denote the profit of each seller if both sellers set price p^ and if all consumers
of generation j with v, > p^ randomize with equal probability between the two sellers,
such that each seller faces demand of measure 1/2 SjDip^), i.e.,
1
-n-cisj) = - SjDip^) • ip, - c). (3)
2
This profit TT^  in our price-setting game correspotids to the symmetric per-firm Cour-
not profit, i.e., the equilibrium profit of each firm in a one-shot quantity-setting game.
In the following I shall refer to p^. as the Coumot price and to TT,. as the Coumot profit.
Proposition 1. Suppose n = 2, Si > 0, Sj — 0. Then
(i) There exists a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium in which each seller offers a
MFC clause and obtains the symmetric, per-firm Coumot profit 7^Xs^).
(ii) There exists no subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the sellers make asymmetric
profits that add up to twice the symmetric Coumot profit or in which the joint profits
of both sellers exceed twice the symmetric Coumot profit.
(iii) There exists no subgame-perfect equilibrium in whieh any seller makes positive prof-
its unless each seller offers at least a MFC clause.
Proof. To prove part (i), consider the following strategies:
Strategy of seller 5, 5 £ {/\, B}: Offer MFC clause in period 1. If both sellers have offered
MFC clause, set ps - pc- Otherwise sttpl = c. If no seller has deviated in period 1, set
pl > Pc^ otherwise set pi = c.
A sufficient condition for this is that D(p) is twice continuously differentiable and concave.
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Strategy of buyer /, / G [0, I], of generation7 = 1; If no seller has deviated in period 1
and if v-; > /?,., buy from any of the two sellers (randomizing with equal probabilities).
Otherwise delay your purchase (unless min{p\, ps] < c and v-, > m'm{p\,pB}, in which
case buy from any seller offering the lowest price). If you did not buy in period 1 and if
vf, >: min{pA, PB}^ buy from any seller offering the lowest price.
These strategies sustain the symmetric pair of Coumot profits (77-^ , TT^ ) as the outcome
of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. To prove this I have to show that the strategies given
above are optimal for each player after any history not resulting from simultaneous de-
viations. Then the path generated by these strategies is indeed the equilibrium path of a
subgame-perfect equilibrium.'^ The optimality of the strategy of an individual buyer is
straightforward. If no seller has deviated in period 1, buyer / expects prices to rise in
period 2, so he is better off buying in period 1. But if one of the sellers deviated in period
1, he expects a price war in period 2, so it is optimal to delay his purchase (as long as
mm{pi,pB}, ^ c).
To prove the optimality of the sellers' strategy, note that if both sellers have offered
MFC clauses they cannot price discriminate between customers in period, 1 and 2. Sup-
pose PA= PB = Pc and all consumers with v', >: p^ have bought in period I, half from
seller A and half from seller B. Then, by the definition of p^, a seller has no interest in
competing for customers with lower reservation values. This means he may just as well
raise his price. However, if any of the sellers deviated in period 1 and all consumers
delayed their purchase, then we have a Bertrand game in period 2, and each seller will
set price equal to marginal cost. It remains to show that the first part of the seller's strategy
is optimal. Since the buyers' strategies prescribe that after any deviation all buyers post-'
pone their purchases so that a price war will take place in period 2, a deviation in period
1 from p^ cannot pay, nor does it pay not to offer the MFC clause in the first place.
The proofs of parts (ii) and (iii) are relegated to the Appendix. Q.E.D.
The equilibrium outcome described in Proposition l(i) is of course not unique. The
same sorts of strategies with MFC clauses can be used to sustain profits smaller than
Coumot profits. But it is not possible to sustain any joint profits higher than twice the
symmetric Coumot profit, no matter what clauses the sellers might offer. If higher prices
are chosen in period 1, there is more residual demand left in period 2 and, by the definition
of Pc, MFC clauses will no longer suffice to prevent competition for this residual demand.
Proposition 1 shows also that in order to sustain collusion it is necessary that both sellers
offer MFC clauses. A seller with no MFC clause would always lower his price in period
2 to capture some of the remaining consumers.
In a similar two-period/no-entry model. Holt and Scheffman (1987) showed that MFC
and MOR clauses together with advance list price notifications enable the sellers to sustain
Coumot profits. Proposition 1 makes clear that MFC clauses are necessary and sufficient
for collusion, provided that purchase contracts are binding and buyers act strategically. In
Holt and Scheffman's model MOR clauses are necessary because purchase contracts are
not binding, i.e., buyers can switch sellers even after they bought the good.'^ A MOR
'^  To see this, consider a strategy profile that specifies optimal behavior for all subgames that can be
reached without simultaneous deviations but that does not specify optimal behavior for some subgames that
can be reached only by simultaneous deviations. Replace that part of the strategy profile in subgames that
follow simultaneous deviations by arbitrary subgame-perfect equilibrium behavior. This modified strategy pro-
file is indeed a subgame-perfect equilibrium and has the same equilibrium path as the original strategy profile.
See Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986).
'^  In Holt and Scheffman the idea is that contracts are signed in either period I or 2, but that consumption
takes place only after period 2. Tben buyers might be able to refuse delivery if they have found a better price
in the meantime. This seems to be particularly relevant for producer good markets where delivery may take
place only some time after a contract has been signed. However, in markets for consumer durables, on which
I focus here, consumption starts as the product is bought, and returning the good is typically not feasible. I
am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this distinction.
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clause allows a seller to meet his opponent's price cuts and thus keeps the opponent from
wooing away any of his first-period customers. But if contracts are binding, as I assume,
this potential function of MOR clauses is not needed. Furthermore, Holt and Scheffman's
sellers use advance list price notification to coordinate on a collusive price in the first
period."* As Proposition 1 shows, this is not necessary if consumers act strategically and
can postpone their purchase if they expect a price war.'^
In the remainder of this article I analyze the extent to which the results derived in
the framework of Proposition 1 carry over to a framework that explicitly allows for entry
of new consumers. As argued above, in retail markets for consumer durables, sellers typ-
ically do not face all their potential customers at the same time. Proposition 2 shows that
in the two-period setup of E*roposition 1, collusion can no longer be sustained if there is
new entry in period 2.
Proposition 2. Suppose n = 2, Si > 0 and 5; > 0. Then there exists no subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which any seller makes positive profits.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The collusive outcome of Proposition 1 relied on the fact that MFC clauses lower the
incentive to compete for customers in the last period. However, they do so only to a limited
extent, and in particular they cannot prevent price competition if there is entry of new
consumers. Each seller will lower his price, at least by a small amount, if he hopes to
win some of the new demand. Expecting this price competition, consumers prefer to delay
their purchase and buy at the best price in period 2.
MOR clauses cannot prevent this price competition in the last period either. But they
can be used to sustain collusive prices in early periods. If a seller offers a MOR clause
and deviates from the collusive price, then his opponent can punish him in the following
period with a price cut that he has to meet. As Proposition 2 shows, collusive prices in
early periods do not yield collusive profits if all consumers can postpone their purchase
until the very last period. But if the horizon is long enough so that consumers of early
generations are not willing to wait until the end before they buy, then collusive profits
can be sustained for at least some periods.
Define
p ^ = a r g m a x D{p) -(p - c) (4)
p
as the "static" monopoly price given demand D(p). Furthermore, let
-^miSj) = iPn, - C) • Sj • D{pJ (5)
be the joint monopoly profit in period t = j if all consumers of generation j with reservation
value v'ij s p^ buy from any of the sellers. Then I can state my main result:
Proposition 3. Suppose n ^ 2 and y^ ^ 0, V, = 1, . . . , «. Then there exists a subgame-
perfect equilibrium in which seller A offers a MOR clause in each period and both sellers
offer the monopoly price in all but the last period.'^
Proof. See the Appendix.
" I.e., each seller is allowed to react to his oppwnenfs price before any consumer can buy in period 1.
" In Holt and Scheffman's model, consumers are assumed to buy in the first period whenever their
reservation value is higher than or equal to the symmetric price offered by the sellers.
'*• If clauses and prices are chosen simultaneously in every period, at least two MOR clauses are needed
to sustain collusion in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. I am grateful to a Coeditor who pointed out to me that
this is an equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies. There exists, however, a collusive subgame-perfect equi-
librium in undominated strategies in which both sellers offer both clauses.
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Let us try to give some intuition as to why one MOR clause is enough to sustain
monopoly prices. The idea is that if one of the sellers deviates from p^ he triggers a price
war in the following period. Anticipating this price war, all consumers who want to buy
now buy from A to guarantee themselves the future rebate. So the deviant is worse off
than if he had stuck to the collusive price.
But in the very last period a price war is unavoidable. So why can collusive prices
be sustained in the penultimate period? Note that all customers who buy in period n - 1,
anticipating the price war in the last period, will buy from A to make sure they get the
rebate. Therefore prices announced in period n — 1 do not affect profits: B does not get
any customers anyway, and 4^ is forced to repay any profits as rebates in the following
period. Since the sellers are indifferent to which price to announce in period n — I, they
are free to use these prices to sustain collusion in the previous periods. If any of the sellers
deviated from setting, say, the monopoly price in period n — 2, then it is a credible threat
to lower prices to marginal costs in period n - 1 and thus to reduce profits of period
M — 2 retroactively. On the other hand, if there has been no deviation, it is perfectly
rational for both sellers to set the monopoly priee in period n - 1 because these prices
do not matter for profits anyway. Note that any sequence of price pairs other than mo-
nopoly prices could be sustained with similar strategies.'^
Corollary 1 characterizes the profits resulting from the sequence of equilibrium prices
just described.
Corollary L In the subgame-perfect equilibrium described in Proposition 3, the duopolists
make monopoly profits in all but the last three periods of the game.
Since price clauses apply only for the period following the purchase, only customers
who buy in the last two periods can benefit from the priee war in period n. But at most
the last three generations of consumers consider buying in the last two periods. Given that
the monopoly price is the same in each period, all other generations of buyers (weakly or
strongly) prefer to buy when they enter the market (if at all), and no rebates are paid to
them. Thus, the sellers gain monopoly profits from all but the last three generations of
consumers. In general, the length of the competitive part at the end of the game depends
on the number of periods a consumer may be willing to delay his purchase and on the
number of periods to which the MOR clause applies.'* However, it is independent of the
length of the game. Finally, note that even if the sellers offer additional MFC clauses,
they cannot prevent the priee competition in the very end, for the same reason as in the
two-period setup of Proposition 2.
It is interesting to compare these results with the situation of a durable-good monop-
olist. The monopolist should be less tempted to lower his price if new consumers with
high reservation values enter the market over time. Sobel (1991) analyzes such a game
and finds that a typical price pattern involves high prices for a number of periods and
occasionally low prices to serve the buyers with low reservation values that have accu-
mulated over several periods. However, the monopolist would be better off if he eould
commit to a price sequence of static monopoly prices for each new generation in each
period. This is exactly what the duopolists in my model can achieve with the help of MOR
clauses, sinee any temptation to cut prices occasionally can be kept under control with
the threat to punish retroactively.
" This is not a simple corollary to Benoit and Krishna's (1985) folk theorem for finitely repealed games
with complete information. In contrast to Benoit and Krishna, my result does not hinge on the existence of
multiple equilibria in the stage game. Furthermore, in my game the history of past prices and consumer de-
cisions determines a "state" in each period, i.e.. the fraction of consumers to whom rebates have to be paid
if prices are lowered. Thus, this game is not a simple repeated but rather a stochastic game.
" See footnotes 7 and 10.
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Proposition 3 carries over to demand specifications where different generations of
consumers differ not only in size but also with respect to the distribution over types, so
that the static monopoly price may vary for each generation. This is because the duopolists
can sustain any sequence of price pairs with strategies like the ones described in Propo-
sition 3 (with just one seller offering a MOR clause). But if this price sequence requires
occasional price cuts, the sellers cannot realize the full static monopoly profit in each
period, as in Corollary I, since some rebates have to be paid along the equilibrium path
whenever prices go down. Furthermore, since consumers want to take advantage of these
rebates, in periods preceding price cuts everyone will go to a seller who offers a MOR
clause. Thus, in these periods symmetric and strictly positive profits can be sustained only
if each seller offers a MOR clause.
4. Conclusions
• This analysis has shown that both MFC and MOR clauses potentially can serve as
collusion-facilitating devices. With MFC clauses, the oligopolists can tackle the problem
of price competition in the last period, which typically prevents collusion in finite-horizon
games. But their collusive effect is limited. Not only is the range of sustainable collusive
prices restricted to Cournot prices, they are also not powerful enough to prevent price
competition if there is entry of new consumers. This makes them less valuable for retail
markets for consumer durables.
MOR clauses allow retroactive punishment of deviations from collusive behavior.
Thus the sellers can use them to sustain collusive prices in early periods, even though
they cannot prevent competitive prices in the very end. This makes MOR clauses very
powerful in retail markets for consumer durables.
This article has studied best-price clauses in a setting where consumers consider goods
offered in different periods as (perfect or imperfect) intertemporal substitutes. My frame-
work also allows for repeat purchases. Instead of considering n different generations of
buyers, take for simplicity just two different populations, j = 1,2. Buyers of population
1 have a preference to buy in odd-numbered periods, whereas those of population 2 prefer
to buy in even-numbered periods. Each purchase can be delayed, but at most for one
period. The results of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 are unaffected by this different inter-
pretation.
The article stresses the anticompetitive potential of best-price clauses. But, as indi-
cated in the introduction, best-price clauses may also help to save transaction costs, so
there is a potential tradeoff. It would be an interesting task for future research to explicitly
model these transaction costs and to analyze this tradeoff in a unified framework.
Appendix
• Proofs of Propositions l(ii). I(iii). 2. and 3 follow.
Proof of Proposition I. pan (ii). As will be shown in Proposition l(iii), no seller can make a positive profit
unless each seller offers al least a MFC clause. Suppose there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
in which the sellers offer at least a MFC clause and make joint profits higher than twice the symmetric Coumot
ptx)fit. Then it must be true that m:m{p\, p'^, p),. pi) ^ p > p,. By the definition of p^ there exists a c > 0 such
that
I I
- • D i p ) • ( p - c ) < - - D i p ) • ( p - € - c ) + [Dip - € ) - D[p)] ( p - e - c ) . (A I)
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Consider a seller whose market share is a < 1/2. The effective price he gets for his sales cannot be higher
than p , otherwise consumers would have behaved irrationally. But (Al) implies he would have done better
offering /j - e in period 2, a contradiction.
Suppose there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which the sellers offer at least a
MFC clause and make asymmetric profits that add up to twice the symmetric Coumot profit. Then
niin{;7i,/7e,;7^,/7|} = p^ and one seller has a market share a < 1/2. By (2) this seller would have done better
offering p^ - e in period 2, a contradiction.
The proof for mixed strategies requires lengthy case distinctions and is omitted here. The full proof is
available from the author upon request. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I, part (Hi). Suppose there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive profits for at
least one of the two sellers, although not both of them have a MFC clause. By the continuity and monotonicity
of D(p), this implies that along the equilibrium path there must be a set of consumers with reservation value
vfi > c who did not buy in period I. 1 show that competition for these consumers leads to equilibrium prices
PI= PI = c m period 2. But then no consumer should pay more than c, a contradiction.
Suppose both sellers have no MFC clause or one seller has no MFC clause and the other seller has both
clauses. Then the only equilibrium prices are pi - pi = c. If both prices are higher, at least one seller has an
incentive to undercut his opponent, and if only one price is higher, the seller who charges c would be better
off raising his price.
Suppose A has no MFC clause and B has only a MFC clause (or vice versa). In equilibrium no consumer
will ever buy from seller B in period 1 and therefore the only equilibrium prices in period 2 are pl= pi = c.
To see this, suppose there are some consumers who buy from seller B for a price pi > c. In any pure-strategy
equilibrium in period 2, A will undercut B. If the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, then it must be that
£'(min{p^, p\}) < min{£'(p^), E{pl)}, since p\ > p\ with probability one is not optimal for A, and if p^ s p\
with probability one, nobody should have bought from B in the first place. In any case, consumers would have
been better off had they delayed their purchases instead of buying with seller B, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Proposition l(iii) we know that even without new entry in period 2 no positive
profits can be sustained unless both sellers offer MFC clauses. This is because a seller without a MFC clause
is tempted to compete in period 2 for the remaining consumers with vf, > c. If there is entry in period 2, there
is an even larger set of consumers a seller without a MFC clause would like to compete for. Hence I can use
the same arguments as in Proposition i(iii) to prove that no positive profits can be sustained if at least one of
the sellers does not offer a MFC clause. In the following I consider all cases where both have offered MFC
clauses.
Suppose mm{p\, pi) > c. In the second period, there is a measurable set of new consumers with vfj higher
or equal to tbe price(s) at which consumers bought in period I. Hence, no matter how many sales a seller has
made in period 1, there always exists € > 0 such that he fmds it profitable to lower his price in period 2 by
e and pay rebates to all previous customers if at the same time he wins all the new consumers that have entered
the market. I now show how this affects price competition in period 2.
Suppose both sellers have offered both clauses. Then each seller has an incentive to undercut the other,
and the only equilibrium in period 2 is p\= pi — c.
Suppose A has offered a MFC clause and B both (or vice versa). Then A cannot make any sales in period
1 in equilibrium and so the only price equilibrium is pi = pi = c. To see this, suppose there are some consumers
who buy from A from p'^ > c. Then there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in period 2. If
p\- pl > t^^ 3t least one of the two sellers has an incentive to undercut the opponent to win all of the new
consumers instead of only a fraction, and nobody would charge p' = c. lip^ > pi, B prefers to raise his price
and vice versa. In an equilibrium in mixed strategies it cannot be that pi ^ pi with probability one because
then B cannot win new consumers but has to meet A's price anyway. Furthermore, one can show that com-
petition for new consumers implies that pi < p\ with probability one. Thus consumers who bought from A in
period I would have been better off if they had bought from B or delayed their purchase.
Suppose both A and B have offered only a MFC clause. Then there exists no subgame-perfect equilibrium
in which any seller makes sales in period 1, and thus pi = pi = c. To see this, suppose only one seller
has made sales. Then the same arguments apply as if only one had a MFC clause, a case for which no
positive profits can be sustained, as I bave argued above. Suppose instead that both have made a positive
number of sales. Then the same reasoning as in the previous paragraph shows that there cannot exist a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies in period 2. If the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, then it must be that
E{mm{pl, pi}) < mm[E(pl), E(pl)}, since pi s pi with probability, one is not optimal for A and vice versa.
Furthermore, one can show that competition for new consumers makes sure that pi ^ pi with probability
one and pi < p'g with probability one. Thus, consumers do better if they delay their purchase, since this guar-
antees them (in expected terms) E(m\n{pl, pi}) instead of rmn[E(pl), E(pl)}.
Since in all subgame-perfect equilibria pi = pi = c in period 2, no consumer pays more than c and thus
no positive profits can be sustained. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the following strategies.
Strategy of seller A{B): Offer a MOR clause (no clause) in period t, I = I n - / . If no seller has
deviated in any way so far, choose p'^^B, = Pm, otherwise choose p^ ,Bi = c. ; = 1, . . . , /? - 1. In period n set
PMB) = C.
Strategy of buyer / from generation } = n: Buy in period n from the seller offering the lowest price if
mm{p''^,pB} ^ \^_„.
Strategy of buyer i from generation j = n — 1: If /i has offered a MOR clause in period n - 1 and if
v"„"_' I > c. buy from A in this period (unless seller S, S € {A. B). has offered p's < c. in which case buy from
5 if <;;li s p's). If you did not buy in period n - I, buy in period n from the seller offering the lowest price
ii m\x\{pA, pi)-^ <„-].
Strategy of buyer i from generation y = « - 2: Do not buy in period n - 2 (unless min{pl"^, pl~^} < c
and <^-2 ^ min {•}. in which case buy from the seller offering the lowest price). If A has offered a MOR
clause in period n - 1 and if K'^U ^ c, buy from A (unless min{pr' , pS"'} < c). If A has not offered a MOR
clause and if <;I2 ^ min {PT'.PB''}, buy from the seller offering the lowest price.
Strategy of buyer / from generation y, > = I, . . . , n - 3: If no seller ever deviated, buy in period
/ = j , randomizing between both sellers if v]j > p^. If there has been a price deviation by a seller but A has
offered a MOR clause in period t = j , buy from him in this period if vj; > c (unless seller S, S € [A. B], has
offered p's < c. in which case buy from S if v,y > p's). Otherwise delay purchase. If you did not buy in period
/ = j , buy in period j + 1 from the seller offering the best net price (if this yields nonnegative utility).
A deviation from the prices specified by the seller's strategy does not pay, given the strategies of the
buyers and the opponent. If a seller expects his opponent to set a price equal to marginal cost (after a deviation
or in the last period), he can do no better than setting a price equal to marginal cost himself. If the strategy
prescribes to set the monopoly price, deviation does not pay either, since either nobody will buy from him or.
if he has a MOR clause, he will have to pay back any profits as rebates in the following period. This is true
in all periods including the second-to-Iast one. A will always offer the MOR clause since he expects B to set
PB = c if he does not. Thus the seller's strategy is optimal after any history of the game not resulting from
simultaneous deviations.
The buyer's strategy for generation; prescribes buying in period^ if no deviation has been observed and
if, given the strategies of the sellers, delaying the purchase does not pay. In case of a price deviation, the
buyers expect a price war with prices equal to marginal costs in the following period. Therefore it is optimal
to buy from seller A if he has a MOR clause or to delay the purchase if be has not (unless a seller has deviated
with a price smaller than marginal cost, in which case it is optimal to buy, if at all. from this seller). The same
holds for period j + 1 (if a consumer of generation j did not buy in period j), with the only difference being
that delaying the purchase is not considered any more. Thus if A has not offered a MOR clause and thet^ has
been a price deviation, the buyer will buy from whoever offers the lowest net price. Q.E.D.
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